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Practicing Reference . . .
Other Uses of Legislative History*
Mary Whisner**
Although we usually think of using legislative history to determine legislative intent 
when interpreting statutes, Ms. Whisner shows that legislative documents can be use-
ful for other, less controversial purposes as well.
I	am	rumored	to	believe	that	the	only	legitimate	use	of	legislative	history	is	to	prop	
open	heavy	doors	or	to	put	under	the	seats	of	little	children	not	quite	tall	enough	
to	reach	the	table.	
—	Hon.	Alex	Kozinski1
¶1	Debate	swirls	around	the	use	of	legislative	history	for	interpreting	statutes.2	
Recognizing	this,	many	of	our	presentations	on	how	to	research	legislative	history	
begin	with	a	caveat	that	some	judges	and	scholars	think	it	shouldn’t	be	used	at	all.3	
After	the	caveat,	we	go	on	to	describe	the	documents	that	legislatures	produce	and	
how	to	find	them—but	the	whole	enterprise	is	clouded	by	the	uncertainty	about	
their	use.	Meanwhile,	no	one	seems	to	talk	about	the	other	uses	of	legislative	his-
tory	(and,	more	broadly,	legislative	documents).
¶2	This	column	is	not	an	attempt	to	wade	into	the	fracas	over	using	legislative	
history	to	divine	the	meaning	of	statutes.4	My	goal	here	is	to	illustrate	a	variety	of	
other	uses	for	legislative	history.	The	examples	are	drawn	from	real	legal	work	and	
	 *	 ©	Mary	Whisner,	2013.	 I	am	grateful	 to	Mary	A.	Hotchkiss	and	Nancy	C.	Unger	 for	 their	
assistance	with	this	piece.
	 **	 Reference	Librarian,	Marian	Gould	Gallagher	Law	Library,	University	of	Washington	School	
of	Law,	Seattle,	Washington.
	 1.	 Interbranch Relations: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress,	103d	
Cong.	 83	 (1993)	 (statement	 of	 Judge	Alex	Kozinski).	While	 cautioning	 against	 courts	“allow[ing]	
legislative	history	to	do	too	much	of	the	work	of	 interpretation,”	Kozinski	states	that	 it	“can	be	an	
immensely	valuable	tool	for	resolving	certain	types	of	problems	in	statutory	interpretation.”	Id.
	 2.	 See	Steven m. baRkan et al., FundamentalS oF legal ReSeaRCh	157,	158	n.3	(9th	ed.	2009)	
(citing	sources).
	 3.	 See, e.g.,	Georgetown	Law	Library,	Legislative	History	Research:	A	Tutorial,	at	slide	6,	http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/tutorials/lh/upload/leghist-slide01.pdf	 (Jan.	 2,	 2013)	
(“Can	be	controversial!”).	See also	baRkan et al.,	supra	note	2,	at	158–59	(“This	conflict	has	led	to	a	
re-examination	of	legislative	histories	as	a	subject	in	law	school	legal	research	courses.”).
	 4.	 I	can’t	resist	sharing	something	I	learned	during	my	research:	a	number	of	state	legislatures	
have	enacted	statutes	instructing	courts	to	use	legislative	history	as	an	interpretive	aid.	The	statutes	
are	 listed	 in	 the	appendix,	 infra,	 for	 readers	who,	 like	me,	might	have	heard	 talk	about	 the	use	of	
federal	legislative	history	in	the	federal	courts	without	considering	whether	there	might	be	different	
rules	in	the	states.
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scholarship.	Together	they	provide	many	reasons	to	learn	to	find	legislative	history	
materials.
Legislative Advocacy
¶3	The	students	in	my	law	school’s	legislative	advocacy	clinic	try	to	persuade	
the	 state	 legislature	 to	 enact	 or	 amend	 laws	 to	 address	 perceived	 problems.	 In	
recent	years,	students	have	worked	on	measures	concerning	juvenile	records,	juve-
nile	runaways,	and	compensation	for	people	released	from	prison	after	wrongful	
convictions.	When	the	clinic’s	instructors	asked	me	to	speak	to	the	students	about	
legislative	history	research,	I	realized	they	needed	to	think	about	how	to	mine	leg-
islative	history	for	different	nuggets	than	the	appellate	lawyer	who	wants	to	argue	
for	 a	 particular	 interpretation	 of	 ambiguous	 statutory	 language.	 If	 the	 students	
hope	to	advocate	amending	an	existing	statute,	they	might	ask
•	 Which	legislators	pushed	for	it?
•	 What	did	they	say	they	wanted	to	accomplish?	Can	we	go	back	and	argue	
that	the	law	didn’t	do	what	they	hoped?
•	 Which	citizens	groups	and	government	agencies	testified	for	and	against	
it?	What	were	their	concerns?	Can	we	find	potential	allies	for	our	efforts	
today?	Are	there	potential	opponents	we	should	be	aware	of?
•	 Has	the	legislature’s	makeup	changed	in	a	way	that	will	help	us	or	hurt	us?
Whatever	measures	the	students	are	promoting,	they	should	look	at	measures	on	
related	topics	in	the	last	few	legislative	sessions:
•	 Which	legislators	have	proposed	bills?	Who	is	interested	in	our	issues?
•	 Which	 committees	 considered	 the	 bills?	Were	hearings	held?	Who	 testi-
fied?
•	 How	far	did	the	bills	go?
Gathering	all	 this	 information	can	help	 students	plan	 their	own	efforts	 in	more	
ways	than	one.	When	they	view	committee	hearings,	not	only	can	they	look	at	the	
substance	of	what	legislators	and	witnesses	say,	but	they	can	also	see	what	the	com-
mittee	room	is	like	and	anticipate	the	experience	they	will	have	when	they	travel	to	
Olympia	 to	 testify.	Now	 that	 the	 clinic	 is	 a	 few	years	old,	 the	 students	 can	 even	
watch	webcasts	of	former	students	testifying.5
¶4	Clearly,	 these	 students	can	 learn	a	 lot	 from	 legislative	history	research.	 In	
fact,	the	process	is	generally	more	fruitful	for	them	than	for	the	researcher	who	is	
trying	to	find	a	key	sentence	to	unlock	the	mystery	of	an	ambiguous	phrase	in	a	
statute	 (preferably	 to	 the	 advantage	of	 the	 researcher’s	 client).	We	all	 know	 that	
those	keys	are	rare	and	hard	to	find.
	 5.	 See, e.g.,	 Senate Human Services and Corrections Comm. Hearing,	tvw	 (Mar.	 17,	 2011),	
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011030125	 (testimony	 of	 clinic	
student	Ramona	Whittington	in	support	of	Substitute	House	bill	1793,	restricting	access	to	juvenile	
records)	(video	at	53:00).
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¶5	 Of	 course,	 clinic	 students	 are	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 for	 whom	 this	 research	
would	be	helpful.	Practicing	lawyers,	lobbyists,	public	interest	groups,	and	citizens	
can	 also	 benefit	 from	being	 able	 to	 find	 information	 about	 the	workings	 of	 the	
legislature.
Current Awareness
¶6	To	advise	their	clients	well,	lawyers	often	need	to	anticipate	changes	in	the	
law,	so	it	 is	useful	to	be	aware	of	measures	that	are	introduced	and	how	they	are	
faring.	It	is	not	unusual	to	see	coverage	of	pending	legislation	in	legal	newsletters.	
For	instance,	Interpreter Releases,	a	newsletter	for	immigration	lawyers,	has	a	regular	
feature	 titled	“Newly	 Introduced	 Legislation.”6	A	 recent	 government	 contracting	
newsletter	 notes:	 “Bills	 Would	 Expand	 Contractor	 Whistleblower	 Protections.”7	
Another	newsletter	reports	on	a	Senate	bill,	the	Prepaid	Card	Consumer	Protection	
Act,	that	would	add	some	consumer	protections	and	require	the	Consumer	Finance	
Protection	Board	and	the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation	to	issue	appro-
priate	regulations.8
¶7	Litigators	also	need	to	keep	up	with	new	legislation.	When	the	Protection	of	
Lawful	Commerce	in	Arms	Act	was	enacted,9	the	gun	manufacturers	who	had	been	
sued	by	the	City	of	New	York	moved	to	dismiss	the	case	or	alternatively	to	stay	the	
proceedings	and	vacate	the	approaching	trial	date.	The	city	argued	that	the	act	did	
not	 apply	 and,	 if	 it	did,	 it	was	unconstitutional.	But	 Judge	 Jack	Weinstein	didn’t	
want	to	move	the	trial	date,	and	he	thought	the	recent	passage	of	the	law	was	hardly	
a	reason	for	delay:
The	bill	embodied	 in	 the	Act	has	been	pending	 for	a	 long	 time.	 .	 .	 .	 It	can	reasonably	be	
assumed	that	the	parties	have	already	given	a	great	deal	of	thought—supported	by	legal	and	
other	research—to	its	application	and	validity.	They	should	be	capable	of	promptly	briefing	
both	the	constitutional	and	other	statutory	issues	now	raised.10
	 6.	 Interpreter Releases	is	published	forty-eight	times	per	year	and	is	available	on	Westlaw.
	 7.	 Bills Would Expand Contractor Whistleblower Protections,	gov’t ContRaCtoR,	Sept.	26,	2012,	
at	¶	296.
	 8.	 Monica	C.	Platt,	An Uncertain Regulatory Future for Prepaid Cards,	banking & Fin. SeRvS. 
Pol’y ReP.,	 July	2012,	at	5–6.	The	article	uses	2012	Senate	hearings	 for	 information	about	prepaid	
cards.
	 9.	 Pub.	L.	No.	109-92,	119	Stat.	2095	(2005).
	 10.	 City	of	New	York	v.	Beretta	U.S.A.	Corp.,	2005	WL	2979104,	*1	(E.D.N.Y.	Nov.	7,	2005)	(citing	
the	Congressional Record	and	news	stories).	On	interlocutory	appeal,	the	Second	Circuit	held	that	the	
statute	did	apply.	City	of	New	York	v.	Beretta	U.S.A.	Corp.,	524	F.3d	384	(2d	Cir.	2008).	So,	as	it	turned	
out,	the	trial	did	not	begin	on	schedule	after	all.	But	the	point	remains:	the	judge	believed	that	the	
lawyers	must	have	been	following	legislation	that	could	have	such	a	big	impact	on	their	business	and	
the	case.	Indeed,	the	general	counsel	of	the	named	defendant,	Beretta	U.S.A.	Corp.,	had	testified	at	a	
hearing	on	a	bill	with	the	same	name	in	an	earlier	Congress.	Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2037 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the 
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,	107th	Cong.	79	(2002)	(statement	of	Jeff	Reh).
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Facts
¶8	A	recent	student-written	law	review	article	about	sex	trafficking	opens	with	
the	story	of	Sonia,	a	teenager	from	El	Salvador	who	was	forced	to	work	in	a	brothel	
in	 the	United	 States	 and	 then	 faced	 the	Department	 of	Homeland	 Security,	 the	
Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services,	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice.11	
Using	a	story	is	one	way	to	capture	the	reader’s	attention	and	set	the	scene	for	an	
article,12	and	this	story	does	its	job	well.	Where	did	the	student	author	find	Sonia’s	
story?	 It	 was	 in	 a	 witness’s	 statement	 in	 a	 congressional	 hearing.13	 Later	 in	 the	
article,	the	author	uses	legislative	history	materials	to	support	the	propositions	that	
the	 sex	 trade	 is	 a	 quick	way	 to	make	money,14	 that	 sex	 trafficking	 is	 a	“human	
calamity,”15	that	the	Trafficking	Victims	Protection	Act	was	“part	of	an	ambitious	
endeavor	to	combat	human	trafficking,”16	and	that	the	act	“took	a	decidedly	vic-
tim-centered	approach.”17	The	author	does	not	use	legislative	history	to	argue	for	
an	interpretation	of	the	law.	Instead	he	uses	the	materials	to	provide	context	for	his	
discussion	of	the	law	and	his	eventual	recommendation	that	Congress	amend	it.
¶9	Many	authors	use	legislative	materials	as	sources	for	facts	and	stories.	For	
instance,	two	academics	used	committee	reports	alongside	journalistic	accounts	to	
summarize	insider-trading	scandals.18	A	judge	cited	two	committee	reports	to	sup-
port	his	assertion	that	“[t]he	declining	fortunes	of	the	nation’s	rail	industry	came	
to	a	crucial	focus	in	the	1970’s,	when	the	collapse	of	several	major	carriers	neces-
sitated	a	substantial	federal	effort	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	vital	service	and	to	
restore	the	rail	industry	to	a	level	of	financial	health.”19	A	student	drew	facts	about	
the	danger	of	algae	blooms	from	committee	reports.20	Another	student	used	legis-
lative	materials	as	sources	for	statistics	about	the	number	of	people	with	disabili-
ties,	their	high	rate	of	unemployment,	and	their	low	incomes.21	A	judge	reviewing	
	 11.	 Theodore	 R.	 Sangalis,	 Comment,	 Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked 
Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,	80	FoRdham l. Rev.	403,	404–05	(2011).
	 12.	 See, e.g.,	ChiP heath & dan heath, made to StiCk	 206	 (2007)	 (discussing	 the	power	of	
stories);	helen SwoRd, StyliSh aCademiC wRiting	85–86	(2012).	By	the	way,	I	highly	recommend	
both	of	these	books.
	 13.	 Sangalis,	supra	note	11,	at	404	n.1	(citing	Legal Options to Stop Human Trafficking: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,	110th	Cong.	74	
(2007)	(statement	of	Katherine	Kaufka,	Nat’l	Immigrant	Justice	Ctr.)).
	 14.	 Id.	at	412	n.77	(citing	International Trafficking in Persons: Taking Action to Eliminate Modern 
Day Slavery: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,	110th	Cong.	19	(2007)	(statement	of	
Sharon	Cohn,	Senior	Vice	President,	Int’l	Justice	Mission)).
	 15.	 Id.	at	413	n.96	(citing	h.R. ReP. no.	110-430,	pt.	1,	at	34	(2007)).
	 16.	 Id.	at	417	n.141	(citing	H.R.	Rep.	No.	106-487,	pt.	2,	at	2	(2000)).
	 17.	 Id.	 at	 418	 n.144	 (citing	 Implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations,	 107th	Cong.	 3	 (2001)	 (statement	 of	Hon.	Henry	 J.	Hyde,	
Chairman,	H.	Comm.	on	Int’l	Relations)).
	 18.	 thomaS l. hazen & JeRRy w. maRkham, bRokeR-dealeR oPeRationS undeR the SeCuRitieS 
and CommoditieS law	§	2:28	(Westlaw	Nov.	2012).
	 19.	 Simmons	v.	I.C.C.,	697	F.2d	326,	328	(D.C.	Cir.	1982).
	 20.	 Marcel	De	Armas,	Changing Tides: The Need for New Legislation to Prevent Algae Blooms,	7	
SuStainable dev. l. & Pol’y	44,	44	nn.1–2,	4,	7–8,	10	(2006).
	 21.	 Reese	John	Henderson	Jr.,	Special	Project,	Addiction as Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics 
and Drug Addicts Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,	44	vand. l. Rev.	713,	714	n.3	
(1991)	(citing	the	Congressional Record	and	a	committee	report).
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an	asylum	denial	cited	NGO	human	rights	reports	that	had	been	published	in	the	
Congressional Record.22	Another	judge	used	statistics	from	the	Congressional Record	
to	support	a	claim	of	 tepid	enforcement	by	 the	Department	of	 Justice	under	 the	
Child	Support	Recovery	Act.23
¶10	Two	more	examples	come	from	state	search	and	seizure	cases.	In	a	Vermont	
case,	the	issue	was	whether	officers	had	reasonable	suspicion	to	pull	over	a	car	after	
seeing	a	thin	red	beam,	which	the	officers	thought	might	be	a	laser-sighting	device	
for	a	gun	but	was	in	fact	a	laser	pointer.	The	majority	found	that	the	officers’	infer-
ence	that	it	was	a	sighting	device—and	that	a	sighting	device	was	of	concern—was	
reasonable,	 citing	 introduced	bills,	 statements	 in	 the	Congressional Record,	 and	 a	
committee	report	to	support	the	claim	that	laser	sights	are	becoming	prevalent	and	
are	used	in	committing	crimes.24	In	a	Florida	case,	the	issue	was	whether	officers	
had	reasonable	suspicion	to	stop	and	frisk	a	young	man	at	a	bus	stop,	based	on	an	
anonymous	tip	that	he	had	a	gun.	The	majority	held	that	the	officers	did	not,	and	
hence	suppressed	the	evidence	they	found.25	A	dissenter	believed	that	the	anony-
mous	tip	was	sufficient,	bolstering	his	position	with	a	description	of	the	prevalence	
of	gun	violence	and	citations	from	the	Congressional Record	about	violent	crimes	
committed	by	juveniles.26
¶11	Why	use	legislative	materials	as	a	source	for	facts?	First,	they’re	widely	avail-
able.	It’s	easier	for	a	 law	student	to	find	a	committee	report	that	summarizes	the	
hazards	of	algae	blooms	than	to	sort	through	marine	biology	journals.	If	a	judge	
wants	support	for	his	assertion	that	juvenile	crime	is	on	the	rise,	the	Congressional 
Record	is	handier	than	formal	criminology	journals	and	texts.27
¶12	 Second,	 the	materials	 probably	 seem	 like	 good,	 credible	 sources.	But	 are	
they?	Maybe,	maybe	not.	On	the	one	hand,	many	people	preparing	to	testify	before	
a	congressional	committee	take	great	care	to	get	their	facts	straight	and	to	present	
careful,	 well-reasoned	 arguments.	 Reliability	 might	 be	 increased	 by	 the	 setting,	
since	their	assertions	could	be	probed	by	committee	members,	other	witnesses,	or	
the	press.	On	the	other	hand,	a	wide	variety	of	people,	representing	many	interests	
and	views,	testify.	Even	without	intending	to	deceive,	they	could	present	“facts”	that	
are	less	than	rock	solid.	Likewise,	the	assertions	senators	and	representatives	make	
in	 the	Congressional Record,	 many	 of	 them	motivated	 by	 politics,	 might	 not	 be	
entirely	reliable.	Despite	these	cautions,	legislative	materials	are	a	useful,	practical	
source	for	many	facts.28
	 22.	 Marcu	v.	I.N.S.,	147	F.3d	1078,	1082	(9th	Cir.	1998).	The	dissenting	judge	also	cited	reports	
and	statements	in	the	Congressional Record.	Id.	at	1087.
	 23.	 United	States	v.	Mussari,	168	F.3d	1141,	1145	(9th	Cir.	1999)	(Kozinski,	J.,	dissenting	from	
denial	of	rehearing	en	banc).
	 24.	 State	v.	Kindle,	751	A.2d	757,	758–59	(Vt.	2000).	The	court	also	cited	legislation	from	two	
other	states.
	 25.	 J.L.	v.	State,	727	So.	2d	204,	209	(Fla.	1999).
	 26.	 Id.	at	211	n.8	(Overton,	J.,	dissenting).
	 27.	 This	point	is	weaker	now	than	it	was	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago.	I	suspect	that	most	law	stu-
dents	are	more	comfortable	searching	Google	Scholar,	newspaper	archives,	or	periodical	indexes	from	
other	disciplines	than	they	are	working	with	legislative	history	materials.	See, e.g.,	Frederick	Schauer	&	
Virginia	J.	Wise,	Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law,	39	J. legal Stud.	495,	513	(2000)	
(“[I]n	previously	barely	imagined	ways	the	universe	of	nonlegal	information	is	now	easily	and	cheaply	
available	to	lawyers,	judges,	and	other	legal	decision	makers.”).
	 28.	 For	 a	 discussion	 of	 judges’	 use	 of	 outside	 research,	 see	 Elizabeth	 F.	 Judge,	Curious Judge: 
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Overview and Perspective
¶13	It	is	often	hard	to	make	sense	of	a	statute	by	jumping	into	it	section	by	sec-
tion.	It	helps	to	get	an	overview	and	some	sense	of	what	motivated	the	legislature.	
Here,	 legislative	 history	 can	 be	 very	 useful.	 (Note	 that	 I’m	 not	 saying	 that	 the	
reports	and	so	on	would	trump	the	clear	words	of	the	statute—just	that	they	can	
provide	a	context.)
¶14	If	you	wanted	to	learn	about	the	Child	Protection	Act	of	2012,	you	could	
go	directly	to	the	statute.	After	Section	1	(Short	Title),	you	would	find:
SEC.	2.	ENHANCED	PENALTIES	FOR	POSSESSION	OF	CHILD	PORNOGRAPHY.
(a)	CERTAIN	ACTIVITIES	RELATING	TO	MATERIAL	 INVOLVING	THE	SEXUAL	
EXPLOITATION	OF	MINORS.—Section	 2252(b)(2)	 of	 title	 18,	 United	 States	 Code,	 is	
amended	 by	 inserting	 after	“but	 if”	 the	 following:	“any	 visual	 depiction	 involved	 in	 the	
offense	involved	a	prepubescent	minor	or	a	minor	who	had	not	attained	12	years	of	age,	
such	person	shall	be	fined	under	this	title	and	imprisoned	for	not	more	than	20	years,	or	if.”
(b)	 CERTAIN	 ACTIVITIES	 RELATING	 TO	 MATERIAL	 CONSTITUTING	 OR	
CONTAINING	CHILD	PORNOGRAPHY.—Section	2252A(b)(2)	of	title	18,	United	States	
Code,	is	amended	by	inserting	after	“but,	if ”	the	following:	“any	image	of	child	pornogra-
phy	involved	in	the	offense	involved	a	prepubescent	minor	or	a	minor	who	had	not	attained	
12	years	of	age,	such	person	shall	be	 fined	under	this	 title	and	 imprisoned	for	not	more	
than	20	years,	or	if.”29
Unless	you	are	already	steeped	in	the	statutory	framework,	you	would	have	some	
trouble	figuring	out	what	the	old	law	was,	how	the	new	law	changes	it,	and	how	it	
fits	 into	 the	 bigger	 picture.	 Is	 the	 twenty-year	 penalty	 new?	Or	 is	 it	 changing	 a	
penalty	that	was	in	the	statute	being	amended?
¶15	 The	 Congressional	 Research	 Service	 summary	 (available	 on	 THOMAS)	
says	of	this	portion	of	the	law:	“Amends	the	federal	criminal	code	to	impose	a	fine	
and/or	prison	term	of	up	to	20	years	for	transporting,	receiving,	distributing,	sell-
ing,	 or	 possessing	 pornographic	 images	 of	 a	 child	 under	 the	 age	 of	 12.”30	 It’s	
quicker	and	easier	to	understand	than	section	2	of	the	statute	itself.	The	section-
by-section	 analysis	 in	 the	 bill’s	 committee	 report	 summarizes:	 “This	 section	
increases	 the	maximum	penalty	 from	10	 to	20	years	 for	offenses	under	 sections	
2252(b)(2)	and	2252A(b)(2)	of	Title	18	involving	prepubescent	minors	or	minors	
under	the	age	of	12.”31	That	gives	us	important	information	(the	penalty	is	dou-
bling)	in	a	concise	statement.
¶16	Reports	are	also	valuable	for	the	context	of	the	legislation.	In	this	situation	
you	aren’t	looking	for	something	short	(the	report	on	the	Child	Protection	Act	is	
more	than	six	times	as	long	as	the	act32),	but	rather	for	something	that	explains	the	
Judicial Notice of Facts, Independent Judicial Research, and the Impact of the Internet,	2012	ann. Rev. 
Civ. litig.	325.	In	the	cases	I’ve	mentioned,	judges	are	generally	using	the	Congressional Record	and	
other	materials	for	“legislative	and	social	framework	facts”	rather	than	“adjudicative	facts.”	See id.	at	
331.
	 29.	 Child	Protection	Act	of	2012,	Pub.	L.	No.	112-206,	§	2,	126	Stat.	1490,	1490.
	 30.	 Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012), H.R.6063, CRS Summary,	thomaS,	
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR06063:@@@D&summ2=m&	 (last	 visited	 Feb.	 6,	
2012).
	 31.	 h.R. ReP. no. 112-638,	at	17	(2012).
	 32.	 The	report	is	thirty-two	pages,	while	the	session	law	is	barely	five	pages	long.
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prior	state	of	the	law,	the	problem	the	law	is	supposed	to	address,	and	how	the	law’s	
sponsors	think	it	will	help.	The	report	includes	a	discussion	headed	“Background	
and	Need	for	the	Legislation.”33	You’ll	also	find	“Dissenting	Views,”	which	contains	
a	 discussion	 of	 the	 bill,	 its	 background,	 and	 the	 reasons	 three	 of	 the	 committee	
members	opposed	it.34	If	you	are	interested	in	the	due	process	concerns	raised,	you	
can	use	this	section	as	a	starting	point	for	further	research,	since	the	dissenters	cite	
and	discuss	two	Supreme	Court	cases.35
¶17	The	authors	of	treatises	and	practice	guides	recognize	the	value	of	context	
and	often	include	a	discussion	of	legislative	history	when	they	outline	a	statutory	
scheme.	For	example,	the	Bankruptcy Desk Guide	uses	committee	reports	to	com-
pare	the	Bankruptcy	Code	with	the	Securities	Investor	Protection	Act.36	Securities 
Litigation: Damages	uses	legislative	history	to	give	context	for	the	provisions	con-
cerning	lead	plaintiffs	and	lead	counsel	in	the	Private	Securities	Litigation	Reform	
Act	 of	 1995.37	 The	Department of Justice Manual	 uses	 legislative	 history	 for	 the	
background	 of	 the	 Freedom	 of	 Access	 to	 Clinic	 Entrances	 Act.38	 Hazen	 and	
Markham	cite	hearings	from	the	1920s	through	the	1980s	to	demonstrate	the	long	
history	of	broker-dealer	regulation.39	The	Health Law Handbook	cites	hearings	in	
explaining	the	statutory	framework	for	the	Stark	Act’s	specialty	hospital	loophole.40	
And	Food and Drug Administration	uses	a	variety	of	materials	to	discuss	the	history	
of	premarket	approval	of	medical	devices.41
Critique and Analysis
¶18	Sifting	through	legislative	history	is	also	useful	for	commentators	who	want	
to	 step	 back	 to	 analyze	 the	work	 of	 the	 legislative	 body.	 For	 example,	 a	 student	
author	 carefully	 traced	 the	 history	 of	 legislation	 protecting	 the	 domestic	 catfish	
industry.42	A	central	provision	defines	“catfish”	in	such	a	way	that	Asian	fish	resem-
bling	the	North	American	catfish	cannot	be	labeled	“catfish.”	The	author	does	not	
argue	that	the	statute	should	be	interpreted	otherwise.	Her	point,	rather,	is	that	the	
definition	was	written	as	it	was	because	of	the	influence	of	the	catfish	industry.43
¶19	A	 researcher	 can	 look	at	 a	very	 specific	provision—like	 the	definition	of	
“catfish”—or	 at	 a	 broad	 class	 of	 legislation.	When	William	 Eskridge	 wanted	 to	
	 33.	 h.R. ReP. no. 112-638,	at	4–11.
	 34.	 Id.	at	24–32.
	 35.	 Id.	at	27	(citing	Sandstrom	v.	Montana,	442	U.S.	510	(1979),	and	Francis	v.	Franklin,	471	U.S.	
307	(1985)).
	 36.	 3	bankRuPtCy deSk guide	§	34:147	(Westlaw	Aug.	2012).
	 37.	 miChael J. kauFman, SeCuRitieS litigation: damageS	§	3:14	(Westlaw	Sept.	2012).
	 38.	 4	dePaRtment oF JuStiCe manual,	at	tit.	8,	no.	6	(Westlaw	2013).
	 39.	 hazen & maRkham,	supra	note	18,	at	§	8:15.
	 40.	 2006	health law handbook	§	13:4	nn.4,	7,	9–12,	14	(Alice	G.	Gosfield	ed.,	Westlaw	June	
2012).
	 41.	 1	JameS t. o’Reilly, Food and dRug adminiStRation	§	18:61	(3d	ed.,	Westlaw	Dec.	2012).
	 42.	 Kerrilee	E.	Kobbeman,	Legislative	Note,	Hook, Line and Sinker: How Congress Swallowed the 
Domestic Catfish Industry’s Narrow Definition of this Ubiquitous Bottomfeeder,	 57	aRk. l. Rev.	 407	
(2004).
	 43.	 Id.	at	417.
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determine	how	often	Congress	overrides	the	Supreme	Court’s	interpretation	of	a	
statute—and	what	sorts	of	decisions	are	most	often	affected—he	and	his	research	
assistants	 reviewed	all	 the	 reports	published	 in	United States Code Congressional 
and Administrative News	 to	 spot	occasions	when	 the	committee	 indicated	 that	a	
statute	“overruled,”	“modified,”	or	“clarified”	a	federal	 judicial	 interpretation	of	a	
statute.44	 Like	 the	 catfish	 piece,	 this	 article	 did	 not	 use	 the	 legislative	 history	 to	
interpret	the	statutes,	but	rather	to	explore	how	the	legislation	came	about.45
¶20	 Eskridge’s	 work	 looking	 at	 the	 institutional	 roles	 of	 Congress	 and	 the	
courts	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 work	 of	 political	 science	 as	 well	 as	 legal	 scholarship.	
Another	 field	 that	 draws	 from	 the	 rich	 body	 of	 legislative	 material	 is	 history,	
including	legal	history.46	Biographers	of	federal	judges,	political	scientists,	and	legal	
scholars	can	all	find	useful	material	in	judicial	confirmation	hearings	and	debates.47
¶21	Legislative	history	materials	can	also	be	used	as	raw	material	for	rhetorical	
analysis.	For	instance,	John	Nagle	looked	at	“endangered	species”	as	a	trope,48	citing	
instances	 from	 the	Congressional Record	 of	politicians	using	 the	 term	 to	 include	
“the	 fine	 people	 of	 San	 Antonio,”49	 the	 public	 lands	 states,50	 the	 middle-class	
taxpayer,51	 small	 gas	 stations,52	“our	maritime	 industries,”53	 the	American-made	
typewriter,54	 and—hold	 onto	 your	 hats—the	 legal	 profession.55	Another	 author	
examined	the	emotionally	charged	language	used	in	discussing	sex	offender	laws.56	
Someone	else	analyzed	the	rhetoric	in	the	debates	on	the	Detainee	Treatment	Act	
of	2005,	placing	 the	debates	“within	broader	American	cultural	narratives	about	
the	law	and	lawyers’	roles	in	society.”57
	 44.	 William	N.	 Eskridge	 Jr.,	Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,	 101	
yale l.J.	331,	336	(1991).	They	weeded	out	some	references	and	also	searched	other	reports,	selected	
hearings,	and	secondary	sources.	Id.	at	336–37.
	 45.	 Eskridge	found,	among	other	things,	that	“decisions	that	were	overridden	were	more	likely	
to	have	relied	on	a	statute’s	plain	meaning	or	the	canons	of	construction	than	either	decisions	not	
scrutinized	or	decision[s]	scrutinized	but	not	overridden.”	Id.	at	351.
	 46.	 See, e.g.,	 Edward	 J.	 Larson,	 “In the Finest, Most Womanly Way”: Women in the Southern 
Eugenics Movement,	 39	am. J. legal hiSt.	 119,	 130–37,	 141–47	 (1995)	 (discussing	 legislation	 in	
Louisiana	in	the	1920s	and	in	Georgia	in	the	1930s	and	citing	state	legislative	journals).
One	 reviewer	of	 the	eleventh	edition	of	 the	Bluebook	 said,	“Use	e.g.	when	 there	are	other	
examples	you	are	 too	 lazy	 to	 find	or	 are	 skeptical	of	unearthing.”	Peter	Lushing,	Book	Review,	67	
Colum. l. Rev.	599,	601	(1967).	I	am	not	at	all	skeptical	of	being	able	to	unearth	many	more	examples	
of	historians	using	legislative	history	material.
	 47.	 In	a	sense,	these	aren’t	“legislative	history”	because	they	don’t	relate	to	legislation.	But	they	
are	documents	produced	by	the	legislature,	and	they	are	researched	using	many	of	the	same	tools	used	
for	legislative	history	documents.
	 48.	 John	Copeland	Nagle,	Endagered [sic] Species Wannabees,	29	Seton hall l. Rev.	235	(1998).
	 49.	 Id.	at	237	n.18.
	 50.	 Id.
	 51.	 Id.	at	237	n.19.
	 52.	 Id.	at	238	n.21.
	 53.	 Id.	at	239	n.25.
	 54.	 Id.	at	239	n.24.
	 55.	 Id.	at	240	n.27.
	 56.	 Mona	 Lynch,	 Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of 
Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation,	27	law & 
SoC. inQuiRy	529	(2002).
	 57.	 Ariel	Meyerstein,	The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants,	18	u. Fla. J.l. & Pub. Pol’y	
299,	300	(2007).
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Conclusion
¶22	None	of	the	examples	discussed	here	is	startling.	As	I’ve	gone	through	each	
set	of	examples—legislative	advocacy,	current	awareness,	facts,	overview	and	per-
spective,	 critique	 and	 analysis—I’m	 sure	 that	 readers	 have	 nodded	 their	 heads,	
thinking	that	each	use	was	familiar.
¶23	If	we	are	aware	of	all	these	uses,	why	do	we	focus	only	on	using	legislative	
history	to	interpret	statutory	provisions?58	Perhaps	because	first-year	law	students	
spend	 so	much	 time	 reading	 appellate	 cases	 and	 often	 compete	 in	 an	 appellate	
moot	 court,	 we	 emphasize	 research	 that	 is	 important	 in	 appellate	 work.	 And	
because	all	eyes	are	on	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court,	we	pay	attention	to	research	tools	
that	are	important	in	appellate	work.	That’s	important	and	students	should	learn	
about	 using	 legislative	 history	 in	 statutory	 interpretation	 (or	 not,	 depending	 on	
jurisdiction	and	interpretive	approach).	But	let’s	remember	the	many	other	uses	for	
legislative	history.
	 58.	 Maybe	I’m	wrong	about	this.	I	haven’t	sat	in	on	the	hundreds	of	presentations	about	legisla-
tive	history	that	are	offered	across	the	country	each	year.	Maybe	lots	of	people	go	beyond	statutory	
interpretation.
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Appendix
State Statutes on Using Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
1.	 Explicit	Direction	to	Use	Legislative	History
Colorado
If	 a	 statute	 is	 ambiguous,	 the	court,	 in	determining	 the	 intention	of	 the	
general	assembly,	may	consider	.	.	.
(c)	The	legislative	history,	if	any;
Colo. Rev. Stat. ann.	§	2-4-203	(West,	Westlaw	through	ch.	2	of	2013	1st	reg.	sess.).
Iowa
If	 a	 statute	 is	 ambiguous,	 the	court,	 in	determining	 the	 intention	of	 the	
legislature,	may	consider	.	.	.
(3)	The	legislative	history.
iowa Code ann.	§	4.6	(West,	Westlaw	2012	reg.	sess.).
Louisiana
A.	When	the	meaning	of	a	law	cannot	be	ascertained	by	[code	provisions	
concerning	plain	language	and	interpretive	rules],	the	court	shall	consider	
the	intent	of	the	legislature.
B.	(1)	The	text	of	a	law	is	the	best	evidence	of	legislative	intent.
(2)(a)	The	occasion	and	necessity	for	the	law,	the	circumstances	under	
which	it	was	enacted,	concepts	of	reasonableness,	and	contemporane-
ous	legislative	history	may	also	be	considered	in	determining	legislative	
intent.
la. Rev. Stat. ann.	§	24:177	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	reg.	sess.).
Minnesota
When	the	words	of	a	law	are	not	explicit,	the	intention	of	the	legislature	
may	be	ascertained	by	considering	.	.	.
(7)	the	contemporaneous	legislative	history;
minn. Stat. ann.	§	645.16	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	1st	spec.	sess.).
New Mexico
C.	[T]he	following	aids	to	construction	may	be	considered	in	ascertaining	
the	meaning	of	the	text:	.	.	.
(2)	the	purpose	of	a	statute	or	rule	as	determined	from	the	legislative	or	
administrative	history	of	the	statute	or	rule;
n. mex. Stat. ann.	§	12-2A-20	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	2d	reg.	sess.).
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New York
The	courts	may	in	a	proper	case	indulge	in	a	departure	from	literal	con-
struction	and	will	sustain	the	legislative	intention	although	it	is	contrary	to	
the	literal	letter	of	the	statute.
Where	there	is	doubt	as	to	the	meaning	of	the	language	of	a	statute,	various	
extrinsic	matters	throwing	light	on	the	legislative	intent	may	be	considered	
by	the	courts.
In	 ascertaining	 the	purpose	 and	 applicability	of	 a	 statute,	 it	 is	 proper	 to	
consider	 the	 legislative	history	of	 the	act,	 the	circumstances	surrounding	
the	statute’s	passage,	and	the	history	of	the	time
If	the	interpretation	to	be	attached	to	a	statute	is	doubtful,	the	courts	may	
utilize	legislative	proceedings	to	determine	legislative	intent.
n.y. Stat.	§§	111,	120,	124,	125	(McKinney,	Westlaw	through	ch.	2,	2013).
North Dakota
If	 a	 statute	 is	 ambiguous,	 the	 court,	 in	determining	 the	 intention	of	 the	
legislation,	may	consider	.	.	.
3.	The	legislative	history.
n. dak. Cent. Code ann.	§	1-02-39	(West,	Westlaw	through	2011	reg.	&	spec.	sess.).
Ohio
If	 a	 statute	 is	 ambiguous,	 the	 court,	 in	determining	 the	 intention	of	 the	
legislature,	may	consider	.	.	.
(C)	The	legislative	history;
ohio Rev. Code ann.	 §	 1.49	 (West,	Westlaw	 through	 file	 201	 of	 the	 2012	 gen.	
assembly	with	exceptions).
Oregon
(1)(a)	In	the	construction	of	a	statute,	a	court	shall	pursue	the	intention	of	
the	legislature	if	possible.
(b)	To	assist	a	court	in	its	construction	of	a	statute,	a	party	may	offer	the	
legislative	history	of	the	statute.	.	.	.
(3)	A	court	may	limit	its	consideration	of	legislative	history	to	the	informa-
tion	that	the	parties	provide	to	the	court.	A	court	shall	give	the	weight	to	
the	legislative	history	that	the	court	considers	to	be	appropriate.
oR. Rev. Stat. ann.	§	174.020	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	reg.	sess.).
Pennsylvania
(c)	 When	 the	 words	 of	 a	 statute	 are	 not	 explicit,	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 	
General	Assembly	may	be	ascertained	by	considering	.	.	.
(7)	The	contemporaneous	legislative	history.
1	Pa. ConS. Stat. ann.	§	1921	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	reg.	sess.).
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Texas
In	construing	a	statute,	whether	or	not	the	statute	is	considered	ambiguous	
on	its	face,	a	court	may	consider	.	.	.
(3)	legislative	history;
tex. gov’t Code ann.	 §	 311.023	 (West,	Westlaw	 through	 2011	 reg.	 sess.	 &	 1st	
called	sess.	of	82d	legis.).
2.	 Arguable	Acceptance	of	Use	of	Legislative	History
Georgia
(a)	In	all	interpretations	of	statutes,	the	courts	shall	look	diligently	for	the	
intention	of	the	General	Assembly,	keeping	in	view	at	all	times	the	old	law,	
the	evil,	and	the	remedy.
ga. Code ann.	§	1-3-1	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	reg.	sess.).
Hawaii
Where	the	words	of	a	law	are	ambiguous:
.	.	.	.
(2)	The	reason	and	spirit	of	the	law,	and	the	cause	which	induced	the	
legislature	to	enact	it,	may	be	considered	to	discover	its	true	meaning.
haw. Rev. Stat. ann.	§	1-15	(West,	Westlaw	through	2012	reg.	and	spec.	sess.).
Massachusetts
(b)	A	court	may	take	judicial	notice	of	.	.	.	legislative	history	.	.	.	.
maSS. gen. lawS ann.	§	202	(West,	Westlaw	through	ch.	464	of	2012	2d	ann.	
sess.).
